Risk. Dealing with Uncertainty in Modern Times
But how to deal with uncertainty and how security is produced varies depending on the social formation. This paper deals with the handling of uncertainty in modern societies. Modern societies always try to conceptualize uncertainties as action-related, responsible and calculable/predictable 'risks'. This was a quite successful approach for a long time. However, under the conditions of 'risk society', this approach is increasingly difficult to work. Especially in the case of 'new risks', the attempt to conceptualize any uncertainty as a predictable and cumulatively controllable risk, can hardly be realized. That's why modern societies must ask for and reflect on a 'new culture of uncertainty'.
The multiplication of discourses on security
If one enters the keyword security/safety in Google, 3.41 billion results are delivered. The keyword risk occurs 838 million times, while there are 'only' 356 millions matches for democracy 1 . Even though the significance of this observation might be challenged by the argument of having countless duplicates of results, these numbers are nevertheless an indicator of the relevance of these issues, not only on the Internet but also in the public 8 discourse. This result is as remarkable as the fact that security/safety is debated four times more often than risks. A keyword like democracy is less popular -in the German speaking circles, the number of articles represents only 1/9 and in the German and English speaking circles it represents only 1/10.
However there are no early comparison data in this sense, which is not surprising considering the history of the internet. But there are a lot of arguments that sustain the idea that the security issue has become more and more relevant in the last 50 years. This can be studied for example with the development of the automobile safety. Even though invented in 1903, the safety belt was unknown for nearly 60 years; however, today, a car without ABS, ESP and (at least) four airbags is considered 'unsafe'. Another example is the change of the biological researches, which for the differentiation between L1, L2 and L3 labs has lead to completely new security standards.
Not quite so far developed is the matter 'Information Security', which until recently hardly played a role, but now it is hotly debated and is regulated by its own ISO standards (ISO 2700x, ISO / EIC 15408). And finally the security requirements and expectations rise in social life as well. This applies not only to the external, but also to the internal security, and here again the demands grow with the social and individual security in a form, that some already talk about a precarious trend towards a 'fully comprehensive' mentality or of 'un-courage to care (Karstadt Quelle 2008) .
It is debatable whether this criticism is justified, especially since the growing security requirements cannot be equated with growing certainties. This is emphasized also by Wolfgang Sofsky in his treatise on 'the principle of security' when he writes:
'People have always lived in a dangerous world. But only since they have topped the masters of this world, they must be attributed all misfortune.' (Sofsky 2005: 29) .
So security becomes a dominant theme only starting with a certain moment of the social development. This requires a change in attitude to the world that is not understood anymore as a predetermined cosmological context 9 that you have to adapt to, but rather a designable and variable context, which is attributed to the actor himself. That is why security means more than 'absence of threat' (Brockhaus 2002 ) and a state of not being threatened.
As Franz-Xaver Kaufmann noted in 1973, it is rather a matter of a value idea that is differenced in various dimensions, which becomes an explicit social project together once the modern societies occur (see Kaufmann 2003: 10) .
This aims to make uncertainties manageable and completely eliminate them, if possible -a claim which, however, that has changed historically and has just been qualified by its increased persecution. How wide the security program of modernity is, is shown far more clearly in the English language than in the German language. While
Figure 1: Conceptions of certainty
Germans have only one word ('Sicherheit'), in English there are at least two to three options ( Figure 1 ). The largest field is occupied (not necessarily content related, but rather from quantitative point of views) by the technical (un)certainties, as they become the theme under the keyword safety or unsafety; here it is about the reliability of components, units, subsystems and whole systems, which are 'asocial', meaning they are considered and analyzed independently from the human influences. However, if human influence factors occur, as it is the case for many social-technical systems and for political-social uncertainties, then in the English language the label security respectively insecurity is needed. This is itself a very broad field that should be differentiated in detail. Because the social embedding of technical risks falling well here under as the question of political and social certainties, and with the growing complexity of individual life courses, the 'biographical security' has finally become a new more and more important research field (see Bonß et al. 2004) .
(Un-)certainties should be considered as a third dimension.
Uncertainties define the cognitive side of the problem. The statement of being certain in case of uncertainties is a contradiction. Because the uncertainties are characterized by the fact that they cannot be clarified definitely with regard to cognitive aspects, but they can be estimated through probabilities. Seen from this angle, the insecurity permanently supposes uncertainty. Because if there was a definitive clarification beyond probabilities, then uncertainties would turn into certainties, which do not exist in this form in the present societies.
The multiplication of the (un-)certainty discourses, as it can be observed, especially since the 50s of the last century, is also remarkable because it also goes hand in hand with a shift in emphasis. Today security becomes a permanent question, because there is no endless security, but only for a time. In other words: security is experienced less and less as an order problem, but more and more as a risk problem. Order problems are characterized by the fact that there is a unique optimal solution for them; once this 'order solution' has been found, it can be assumed that a permanent security is achieved. In high-risk problems, however, there is no clear final solution; rather they are characterized by the fact that the envisaged solutions are always far less than optimal, as they move on to new uncertainties that are either created or only just visible. An example in this sense if the introduction of antilock braking system (ABS) which was 11 considered as an absolute safety mean and which was rewarded also by insurance companies, which bonused cars with ABS in the beginning.
However the insurances fell, since it had been discovered that the accident probability of ABS equipped cars was not lower, but higher. This had to do with the fact that the better breaking systems led to more pileups with vehicles that were not equipped with ABS. On the other side, the ABS protected risky drivers, which often over-compensated the safety increase.
These examples make it clear that safety improvements do not always lead to more security. They can cause much more adverse effects, which generate new uncertainties. This is very often the case and makes it more obvious that security is not perceived as an order problem anymore, but rather as a risk problem. In front of this background the value idea of security seems to have been realized in a rather ambivalent form. This one we cannot assume under any circumstances a linearly increasing security growth. However one can hardly deny the increase of the security level. But because of the disappearing of old uncertainties, new ones occur and the sensitivity towards uncertainty increases as well. Today much more safety/security problems are acknowledged and a form of certainty/uncertainty spiral seems to build up: the higher the safety/security level and the safety/security requirements, the more uncertainties and the more 'new' uncertainties are discovered, which require more efforts during the production of safety, security and certainty. They have strong reaction programs that might not always be appropriate, but as a rule, they are clear and reliable. In comparison, the instinct of humans is only available in a low measure. Indeed the human also presents some 'automatics' in his behaviour (Gehlen 1957: 116) . But as long as he/she can act one way or another, without knowing the future, the human is 'open for the world' (Gehlen 1940: 227) and therefore he/she has a (ultimately existential) experience with uncertainty. Or as Marx Wartofsky expresses it:
'To take or avoid risk requires more than animal response... risk, as a category, applies only to actions of socially conscious agents, capable of understanding an account of their own actions' (Wartofsky 1986: 130-131 ).
More interesting than the existential experience with uncertainty is the fact that the handling of uncertainty is different, depending more on the social context and this applies both for what is perceived as uncertainty and for how one responds to insecurity. This problem can be illustrated by the example described by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982: 6ff.) In the pre-modern Europe there had been similar pattern of dealing with uncertainty. This can be studied both on the large diffusion of superstitious security strategies as well as on the traditional fear of nature, as it had been diffused until the 18th century. As the diffusion of talismans shows, the pre-modern security strategies do not disappear in the modern times either. But at least officially they stand in the background. Because the modern times develop other forms for dealing with uncertainty. As a typically modern form of the concept of risk applies, which is mostly described with reference to danger. Risk and danger are two different forms of the constitution and handling of uncertainty, which coexist only in the modern times. Or, taking the following example: the Lele experience dangers very often, even if they do not perceive them as such, as compared to 14 modern societies; but they know no risks, since this type of uncertainty is tightly bound to the modern world and understanding (see Bernstein 1997) . It means something else: knowing or believing that if one wants to, he can find it out, that, as a principle, there are no invisible, secret forces, that, as a principle, one can control things by calculation' (Weber 1919: 317) . However neither the Italian tradesman of the early times, nor his ancestors were able to put a stop to storms or control the forces to prevent attacks. But such insecurities had no longer been considered fate menaces but they were seen and attributable and calculable challenges, meaning problems that could only occur if one did an incorrect calculation or did not take any prevention measures.
The contradiction of 'fate menace' and 'attributable dare' already reflects a significant change. If someone witnesses, like for Germany of the 16th century, assuming something 'uf unser Rysign' (on my risk), then he/she proves that he/she does not perceive the questioned insecurity/uncertainty as a danger that cannot be influenced, which is caused by the gods or other forces; but he perceives it as a problem caused by himself and therefore a problem for which he/she is to blame. The world is not determined by non-calculable cosmological forces anymore, but the horizon of the own action possibilities is the new limit. This way, new insecure realities can occur, which have other forms -that uncertainty is assumed by the tradesman who is willing to take risks. His insecurities would not exist if he had not wanted to buy or sell goods and they occur only because, being aware of and trusting his own possibilities, he believes he can handle the situation.
In a systematic way this means that as a first and most important feature of the risk concept the action and decision comes before the risks.
Insecurities of the type 'danger' exist independently from the doers;
insecurities of the type 'risk' exist in the light of the intention of actions and their implementation. Or, in another way: dangers do not depend on subject and situation; risk, on the other hand, supposes a subject-related decision for an uncertainty. This point is highlighted mostly in the modern decision theory, as it has been developed in various variants from the company management decision-making theory to the general game theory, up to the 'rational choice concept' 3 . From this point of view, risks are mostly defined as 'decisions made in uncertainty', which are evaluated in another manner than the dangers not depending on the decisions made. While dangers are evaluated negatively as menaces that do not depend on the subject, the same does not apply for risks. Just because they depend on the actions, risks appear not only as menaces, but also as chances. Taking risks means testing the decision, which can go wrong, but which can also bring significant advantages, if successful.
A second feature of the risk concept is tightly linked to the handling and decision, namely their imputability and accountability. Imputability and accountability play a very important role in the daily limitation of risks and dangers. Dangers cannot be accounted for, since they do not depend of the subject and since they are insecurities that cannot be controlled. But everything changes when it comes to risks. If a risky business goes wrong, then a responsible person can (and must) be identified. Because when trying to reach something new, risks are an aware dare and the consequences must be accounted for by the doers, as long as they are identified as decision makers. But this means also: insecurities are perceived as risks only when they can be imputable to a social construction (ideally to an actor). If this imputation is not reasonable, for any other reasons, then the risks appear as dangers or they can turn into dangers.
The last situation is not so rare. Something that is perceived by someone as a voluntary dare, for which that someone is responsible, may be an unwanted menace for someone else. For example, for the early modern tradesman of the seas, his decisions made in uncertainty were risks; for the seamen depending on him, the same insecurities were rather dangers. In other words: one and the same situation can turn into a risk or danger in equal measure. This way, a man driving against the traffic on the motorway is a risk for himself, but becomes a danger to the other traffic participants.
The same applies to investment decisions (as to the act of not assuming any investments), which are a risk for the doers and a danger for the jobs. A similar double structure marks also the processes like approving a new medicine, deciding the location of a garbage dump or granting an operation permit for a gene technological production hall; in this case we speak about risk decisions, which do not represent a danger for the concerned people at the moment of the decision; therefore, for these individuals the uncertainty of the type risk can subtly turn into an uncertainty of the type danger. Weber (1980 Weber ( [1922 : 12f.), basically they are not able to quantify insecurities.
Even if the example of the Lele should not get too strain, the comparison highlights central features of the rational, namely more exactly:
rational and goal-oriented security strategies of the modern time. In the end, these strategies run to a subject and situation dependent handling with uncertainty situations. This handling is subject and situation independent and therefore decontextualized since it supposes a certain calculation, independently from a concrete case. We speak about the probability calculation, which was unknown before the Renaissance, having a rapid growth in the 17/18th century and becoming widespread in the 20th century, when the probability term 'gradually displaced the term of causality' (Reichenbach 1935: V) . With the concept of probability emerge completely new contingencies when handling uncertainty, since the lifeworld experienced prior structure and complexity is overridden and set in a specific form. The one who understands the world as a relation of probabilities perceives reality in a reflexive distance and under a different time horizon. The reality is virtualized and it is disintegrated into an abstract space of possibilities, which can be combined and calculated and whose realization is slowly materialized 'behind the back' of the doers 4 .
In an important way the concept of the risk calculation was described by Frank H. Knight with his differentiation of 'risks' and 'uncertainties'. For
Knight, risks were 'measurable uncertainties' (Knight 1965 (Knight [1921 .) The measurable uncertainties are uncertainties that can be calculated and handled in a specific manner. Technically speaking, we must understand these uncertainties as situations that can be described as a closed event or sample space, whose possible consequences are not known in particular, but as a whole. The paradigmatic example in this sense is the game of dices. The game of dices is an uncertain matter since nobody can know beforehand how the dices will fall. However, the event space and the totality of results is known. For more than six different results cannot exist; should a dice show even a seven, you can safely assume that it has been labelled incorrectly.
And because it is a closed system with clearly defined framework and clear results, a distribution function can be created without any problem, one can calculate the probability of an event that is even uniformly distributed in this case -the chance to roll a certain number of known 1/6. Rather, they are always 'gut decisions' (Gigerenzer 2007) , where 'intuition' (Traufetter 2009 ) is as important as calculation. In addition, the experience gained from the investigation of accidents in high-risk technologies (see Perrow 1987 Perrow [1984 ), shows that the most critical events must be characterized rather as 'uncertainties' than as 'risks'. Thus, accidents are often triggered by 'unexpected interactions' between elements of the system that could be provided in any risk scenario and therefore not calculated and As long as insecurity and uncertainty prevent people at the complete mastery of the inner and outer nature, they are for Parsons a nuisance that must be removed and can be eliminated insofar as the capacity to deal with uncertainty increases systematically in the course of evolution. Although the man may have been overwhelmed with uncertainties at the beginning of the evolution, in time he learns to be aware of them and to successfully deal with them. Or in Parsons' own words: '(...) in the process by which human individuals have become increasingly self-conscious and increasingly concerned to apply consciously formulated knowledge, the capacity to cope with uncertain contingencies very substantially increased' (Parsons 1980: 148) . This is precisely the crucial second part of the standard position of the modernity -as long as the cognitive capacities grow together with the evolutionary progress in dealing with uncertainty and the predictability of the world continues to increase due to the progress of science, there is an inexorable decline of uncertainty -following the motto: provided time and money, everything can be made safe and secure.
It can be doubted that Parsons would have maintained this belief even after the experience of Harrisburg, Chernobyl, 9.11 or Fukushima. An opposite argument is formulated by Felix von Cube, with his thesis that people are always looking for active uncertainties in order to gain security.
Since 'the turn of uncertainty into security is rewarded with passion' (Cube 1990 : 11), uncertainty is not only a must, but also a positive element of evolutionary progress. Von Cube found only partial approval of this thesis in the scientific debates. But there are economists holding similar positive positions, although with very different theoretical justifications, such as the American uncertainty theorist Ronald Heiner (1983 Heiner ( , 1985 . Starting from the thesis that 'uncertainty generates flexibility' (Heiner 1985: 364) he describes uncertainty as a possibility forcing moment, without which neither innovation, nor social development would be possible. For Heiner a society can only remain viable, if it retains a certain 'level of uncertainty ' (see Heiner 1983: 380) . Similar estimates can be found at Aaron Wildavsky (1989: 48ff.) or at insurance companies like the Munic Re, which defended the thesis a quarter of a century ago:
'Uncertainty is next to existential diversity an important structural factor of social development. A general warranty against permanent security means stagnation, inaction, numbness.' (Bavarian Reinsurance 1987: 7).
Despite this, all parties (including Parsons) agree that the evolutionary progress leads to more security. However, this development is interpreted '(...) a pathology of uncertainty is suggested. Doers, actions and situations appear deficient to the extent they are affected by uncertainty.' (Wiesenthal 1990: 47) .
Conversely, intentionality and situation control apply as a proof of a nondeficient action, which knows what it wants and aims to enlarge the space of controllable and to increase the social security level.
Even if the assertion of gradually declining levels of insecurity is still widespread -it has lost its meaning, facing spectacular engineering disasters and new political and social uncertainties. While losing its importance, one can also observe that it has never been undisputed. Thus, it has been assumed for a long time in the social policy debate that:
'(...) uncertainty... (is) the characteristic experience of human existence in the 20th century' (Möller 1960: 25) .
Anyone who accepts this can no longer comprehend uncertainty as an ultimately negative topic. Instead, it is an issue gaining relevance and imposing new theory perspectives in the framework of 'modern modernity'.
In this sense, Helmut Wiesenthal calls for a reversal of the regulatory look à la Parsons. The base and reference point of sociological reconstructions should not be the individual striving for safer control of nature; instead of security rather 'genuine uncertainty as the raison d'être of actors and unsafe action contexts as products of the uncertainty deliberate action' (Wiesenthal 1990: 48) should be perceived -a change of perspective, which ultimately turn the view of the complexity towards the contingency of the social.
The fact that the forming of theory should be based rather on uncertainty than on allegedly growing certainties seems worth considering, not only given the empirically observable 'uncertainties burglaries'. In a systematic way also the 'undeterministic structure of events' (Bonatti 1984: 111ff.) agrees with this, as it is increasingly asserted in the science and probability theory discussions. However, this commitment is not a resounding vote of confidence to the uncertainty. Quite apart from those who hold to the traditional shear awareness optics, the turn to uncertainty is underlined completely differently, namely as an opportunity and threat and 'risk-averse' people is also of limited value. To clarify the conditions under which people assume or reject uncertainty is far more important.
According to the findings of psychological research, this depends primarily on three conditions: For one, the people are more willing to take risks, the more the uncertainty in question is classified as 'old' and thus as known, familiar and potentially controllable. Conversely, uncertainties are rejected if they are 'new', unknown, unfamiliar and therefore appear exactly as potentially unmanageable. The second dimension refers to the type of risk exposure, and ultimately to the definition of risk and danger. People perceive an uncertainty/insecurity as a challenge especially when they expose themselves to it, like driving a car, smoking, or in recreational sports, due to their own decision and thus they experience it as a manageable risk and opportunity. The situation is different when the questioned uncertainty comes from outside, is not assumed voluntarily and is thus seen as an uncontrollable threat. Finally, as a third dimension the perception of potential damage must be noted: if the potential damage, as in the case of a volcanic eruption or a meltdown, is considered 'extraordinary', 'fatal' and 'sudden', then one would not want to expose himself to this danger in any way. If, however, the potential damage is perceived as 'normal', not 'deadly'
and 'chronic', the willingness to engage in uncertainties such as risk sports or smoking increases.
Contrary to initial assumptions of risk research, this behaviour is not irrational at all. The laymen could mistake their evaluations. But if they are particularly risk averse, when the questioned uncertainties are imposed on them, appear as unknown or uncontrollable, and are connected to a potential of catastrophic loss, then this is a perfectly rational adjustment in the sense of 'bounded rationality' (March and Simon 1958: 137ff) , or the 'social rationality' of Perrow (1987 Perrow ( [1984 : 368ff.). Although it does not necessarily correspond to the 'absolute rationality' of experts (see Bonß 1995: 294ff.), therefore it cannot simply be brushed aside because the certainty of experts is usually incomplete as well. It is this insight that is the basis for the 'risk assessment' of the third generation, as it has become more and more important in the German discussion since the mid-80s. In this view, risks could hardly work in accordance with current safety standards, they did not exactly know the dangers they were exposing themselves to. Nevertheless the reason why their behaviour did not generate any questions, is probably because they were successful; the adverse consequences, if they were known at all, seemed to be justified by the success. This pattern was certainly the more problematic the more clearly that the structural change of uncertainty came to light, as it is described in the definition of 'old' and 'new' risks.
The now highly differentiated definition of 'old' and 'new' risks goes back to Ulrich Beck and his analysis of the 'risk society'" (Beck 1986 ). There, Given the fundamental differences regarding uncertainty assumptions and damage expectations it is no wonder that the risk related discourses differ for 'old' and 'new' risks. With the old risks that are associated with positive role models such as the bold engineer or the successful entrepreneur, the slogan 'take risks' comes out in the relevant discourses usually comparatively good. Because this uncertainty is addressed on the basis of a fundamental security assurance -however that may be justified in detail. The situation is very different for the 'new' risks. If these are not actively received and perceived as temporally, materially and socially expanded, then safe uncertainty replaces safe certainty. As a result of this uncertainty, in turn, the 'courage to take risks' is almost inevitably replaced by a 'fear of danger', and this fear is not irrational at all; because of the specific nature of the 'new' risks rather, it can be highly rational.
Regardless of that, the analytical delineation of 'old' and 'new' risks is not enough. Even if it is accepted that there are two fundamentally different uncertainty types that cannot be measured by the same standards, there are still substantial differences, depending on whether the two types of risk are 9 This also applies to a more detailed consideration (see Grawe 2003 , whose interpretation of the facts I do not necessarily share). Although the operators are beyond the 256 million with all their assets and there are additional commitments of the federal government in the amount of € 2.5 million per claim. But the operators are organized as subsidiaries that are likely to go bankrupt in case of damage, and the commitment of the federal government only makes it clear that the coverage of actual GAU is much too low (whereby in serious cases, the damages are also unlikely to be actuarially manageable). The handling of uncertainty from the perspective of the alternative positions looks different. As long as uncertainty does not appear as annoyance but as productivity resource, the classic order and certainty orientation is not dominant, but an orientation towards uncertainty, that could be described in various manners. The switch is already shown during the handling of 'old risks'. Old risks are debated less with regard to their domination and elimination, but the emphasis is on the perspective of an innovation-oriented behaviour, which, based on manageable risk, focuses on an experimental discovery. This does not mean that safety measures play no role. But certainty and innovation are seen in a tensioned relation and the production of certainty is not defined solely through measurability and probability, but also by a problem of experience and intuition. (1995) as well as with the theory of 'reflexive modernization' (Beck 1993, Beck, Bonß and Lau 2001) -that the obsession with order and clarity can be preserved only at the price of deadly exclusion and, with modernization of modernity, this leads to more problems and perplexities. Or the example: the more the clarity and measurability-based risk and safety research progresses, the more obvious is that they cannot or only at the price of precarious side effects reach their goal.
It follows not a rejection of the research oriented to eliminate uncertainty and measurability. But the least one must not be the only reference point. Rather, an uncertainty-oriented pluralism of both the risk discourses and the risk research is desired, in the course of which a specific type of actor could appear, namely as the 'risk-aware' as 'risk-responsible' actor. Such actors, independently whether at expert or Laymen level are characterized by the fact that they can make the difference between various 'risk types' and during the handling of uncertainty they county not only on control and measurability, but also on trust, experience and intuition.
Against this background, they do not understand security as an order problem, rather than a risk or, more precisely, as an 'uncertainty' question.
And this question never can be answered definitively, but only time and depending on the situation. These situational solutions are at the end of professionally and equally democratic values and communication process that is not based on uncertain certainties but on certain uncertainties.
Whether and how such communication processes can be organized is an open question. But it is essential to strive for it, if the 'value idea' certainty is to be developed successfully in the future.
